

Operational Art of Counterterrorism

**A Monograph
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ABSTRACT

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Terrorism is a real threat to the lives of the citizens of the United States and of her allies. Osama bin Laden's organization sponsored the October 2000 attack on the USS Cole which resulted in seventeen dead U.S. sailors, dozens of injuries, and millions of dollars in damage. The terrorists were nearly successful in sinking the multi-billion dollar U.S. warship.

Can the elements of operational design in the U.S. Army's Field Manual (FM) 3-0 (DRAG), *Operations*, be used to frame a counterterrorism (CT) campaign for dealing with Osama bin Laden and his organization? To do so, the operational design presented in FM 3-0 must support CT planning, which is an important issue for the U.S. Army for several reasons. The Army, an important instrument of national power, is employed to shape the global security environment in support of the National Security Strategy. One of the Army's mission essential tasks is to provide support to civilian authorities in dealing with crises. Historically, the Army's support of civil authorities has included a wide variety of missions. Combating terrorism is also a type of stability operation that the Army may execute.

Terrorist acts against the U.S. are intended to limit U.S. engagement and influence in the terrorist's region of interest and throughout the world. Information on terrorist organizations, particularly on Osama bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda organization, will be used here to determine if the elements of operational art in Army doctrine are adequate to develop a concept plan to defeat a terrorist organization. The elements of operational design outlined in FM 3-0 will be used as the framework for analysis.

The discussion begins with the operational environment which forms the framework for the problem. Next, the terrorist organization's perspective is discussed because, to apply the elements of operational design, planners must understand their enemy. Thirdly, U.S. policy and doctrine will be discussed to show the importance of linking planning and actions across all three levels of war, strategic, operational, and tactical. Once the operational environment is defined, the opponent is understood, and the governing policy and doctrine is established, the elements of operational design will be used to develop a campaign plan. The elements of operational design defined in FM 3-0 *Operations* are: end state, center of gravity, decisive points and objectives, lines of operation, culminating point, operational reach, approach and pauses, simultaneous and sequential operations, linear and nonlinear operations, and tempo. Finally, the results of developing a campaign plan to defeat Osama bin Laden will be used as the basis for conclusions and recommendations.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | Page |
|--|------|
| I. The War of the Future..... | 1 |
| II. Operational Environment..... | 4 |
| III. Justifying Terrorism..... | 13 |
| IV. Strategic Policy and Operational Design..... | 25 |
| V. Conclusion and Recommendations..... | 40 |
| VI. Endnotes..... | 42 |
| VII. Bibliography..... | 49 |

*Events in Kenya and Tanzania, Afghanistan and the Sudan in August 1998 demonstrate clearly that terrorism is-and will remain-one of the main threats to international security as we approach the twenty-first century.*¹

Bruce Hoffman, 1999

Chapter 1: “The War of the Future”

Terrorism is a real threat to the lives of the citizens of the United States (U.S.) and of her allies. Osama bin Laden’s organization sponsored the October 2000 attack on the USS Cole which resulted in seventeen dead U.S. sailors, dozens of injuries, and millions of dollars in damage. The terrorists were nearly successful in sinking the multi-billion dollar U.S. warship.

The attack on the USS Cole is only the most recent in a string of attacks by Osama bin Laden and his associates. The August 1998 U.S. military attack against Osama bin Laden which followed the bombing of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania was referred to by former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright as the first blow in “the war of the future.”² Albright’s view of terrorism as “the war of the future” coincides with that of Bruce Hoffman, the noted terrorism expert, as quoted earlier. The rest of bin Laden’s transgressions against the U.S. and her allies are described in later pages.

Another source of urgency for dealing with the problem of terrorism is that the U.S. and her allies spend billions of dollars in combating it. Department of Defense (DoD) expenditures for domestic anti-terrorism preparedness in 1997 were \$36 million, \$43 million in 1998, and \$50 million in 1999. These amounts are miniscule compared to the combined outlays of the other DoD expenditures for combating terrorism, other U.S. agency expenditures, and the amounts spent by other governments around the world.

Can the elements of operational design in the U.S. Army’s Field Manual (FM) 3-0 (DRAG), *Operations*, be used to frame a counterterrorism (CT) campaign for dealing with Osama bin Laden and his organization? To do so, the operational design presented in FM 3-0 must support CT planning, which is an important issue for the U.S. Army for several reasons. The Army, an important instrument of national power, is employed to shape the global security environment in support of the National Security Strategy. One of the Army’s mission essential tasks is to provide support to civilian authorities in dealing with crises.³ Historically, the Army’s support of civil authorities has included a wide variety of missions. Combating terrorism is also a type of stability operation that the Army may execute.⁴

Terrorist acts against the U.S. are intended to limit U.S. engagement and influence in the terrorist's region of interest and throughout the world. By limiting U.S. influence, a terrorist is more able to coerce other governments to meet the terrorist organization's demands. Information on terrorist organizations, particularly on Osama bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda organization, will be used here to determine if the elements of operational art in Army doctrine are adequate to develop a concept plan to defeat a terrorist organization. The elements of operational design outlined in FM 3-0 will be used as the framework for analysis.

The discussion will first begin with the operational environment because the environment is the framework for the problem. Political, informational, military, and globalization dimensions define the operational environment. The effects of globalization, religious and ethnic conflict, U.S. engagement policy, the media, urbanization, and disparity in standards of living are just a few of the issues that influence the operational environment.

Next, the terrorist organization's perspective will be discussed because, to apply the elements of operational design, planners must understand their enemy. Osama bin Laden and his organization will serve as the adversary for analysis for several reasons. Osama bin Laden declared war on the U.S. in 1996. In the same year, the U.S. State Department called bin Laden "one of the most significant sponsors of Islamic extremist activities in the world today."⁵ He is responsible for bombing the World Trade Center in February 1993, Riyadh in November 1995, Dhahran in June 1996, two U.S. embassies in 1998, and the USS Cole in October 2000.⁶ Bin Laden is also linked to several other terrorism plans including an attempted assassination of the Pope during his visit to Manila in late 1994, the simultaneous bombings of the US and Israeli Embassies in Manila and other Asian capitals in late 1994, the midair bombing of a dozen US trans-Pacific flights in 1995, and a plan to kill President Clinton during a visit to the Philippines in early 1995.⁷ He finances a global network of Islamic terrorist organizations operating from the Middle East to Africa, the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Philippines. Additionally, bin Laden is referred to in most threat environment discussions as an example of an important threat to the international security environment.

Thirdly, U.S. policy and doctrine will be discussed to show the importance of linking planning and actions across all three levels of war, strategic, operational, and tactical. Operational design is used by planners to link strategic aims with tactical action. The documents used to investigate U.S. policy and doctrine will be the *National Security Strategy*, the *National Military Strategy*, *Presidential Decision Directive 39*, and FM 3-0 (DRAG) *Operations*.

Once the operational environment is defined, the opponent is understood, and the governing policy and doctrine is established, the elements of operational design will be used to develop a campaign plan. The elements of operational design defined in FM 3-0 *Operations* are: end state, center of gravity, decisive points and objectives, lines of operation, culminating point, operational reach, approach and pauses, simultaneous and sequential operations, linear and nonlinear operations, and tempo.

Finally, the results of developing a campaign plan to defeat Osama bin Laden will be used as the basis for conclusions and recommendations.

Chapter 2: The Operational Environment

Political dimension.

The U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) views the world as an environment full of challenges that transcend national borders. The NSS also sees many nation-states in the world embracing the American way of life and cooperating to deal with transnational threats thanks to a growing global economy. For these reasons, the U.S. justifies its engagement policy by stating:

The security environment in which we live is dynamic and uncertain, replete with numerous challenges. . . . Weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, organized crime and environmental damage are global concerns that transcend national borders. . . . America's core values of representative governance, market economics and respect for fundamental human rights have been embraced by many nations around the world, creating new opportunities to promote peace, prosperity and greater cooperation among nations. Former adversaries now cooperate with us. The dynamism of the global economy is transforming commerce, culture, communications and global relations.⁸

However, the rest of the world does not always share U.S. values or opinions. Many nation-states are unwilling to cooperate with U.S. interests. Even past cooperation in defeating transnational threats does not ensure future cooperation. Saudi Arabia condemned the airstrikes on Iraq on February 21, 2001, defending her former nemesis by saying the airstrikes violated Iraq's sovereignty and territorial integrity.⁹

There are many differing views of the existing and future political dimension of the security environment. Much of the world sees a uni-polar world in which the U.S. dominates the international order.¹⁰ Some people are satisfied with a uni-polar world, while others vehemently oppose the U.S.'s dominance. If a large number of nation-states become unsatisfied with U.S. dominance, then the future global political dimension may be characterized by a bipolar relationship where many nation-states cooperate to balance the power of the U.S. For example, China, India, and Russia could form a geo-strategic alliance.¹¹ Additionally, the US-European alliance may collapse over trade disputes and competition for leadership in deciding security questions.¹²

Global Trends predicts that through 2015 international cooperation among nation-states will increase to promote economic self-interests:

High-income democratic states will seek cooperation to promote their interests, while strongly nationalistic and autocratic states will selectively cooperate to protect their interests without threatening domestic power structures and national sovereignty.¹³

In today's political dimension, many nation-states expect international cooperation with transnational problems that states cannot manage on their own. Some of these problem are identified in the U.S. *National Security Strategy*: religious and ethnic conflict, outlaw states, rapid population growth, drugs, organized crime, proliferation of weapons of mass, environmental damage and terrorism.¹⁴ International cooperation in CT is expected to be very high in the future.¹⁵

Nation-states are not the only influential actors in the political dimension. Non-state actors increasingly influence regional and worldwide events and relations. Nation-states, non-state actors, and transnational entities compete in the diplomatic, informational, military and economic dimensions of the operational environment.¹⁶ Thomas Friedman points out that the ability of non-state actors to influence the operational environment is increasing with globalization, which creates a need to:

balance between individuals and nation-states. Because globalization has brought down many of the walls that limited the movement and reach of people, and because it has simultaneously wired the world into networks, it gives more power to individuals to influence both markets and nation-states than at any time in history. So you have today not only a superpower, not only Supermarkets, . . . you have Super-empowered individuals. Some of these Super-empowered individuals are quite angry, . . . all of them are now able to act directly on the world stage without traditional mediation of governments, corporations or any other public or private institutions.¹⁷

Conflicts not only occur between nation-states, but also between nation-states and non-state actors, e.g. the conflict between the U.S. and Osama bin Laden. After bin Laden declared war on the U.S. and carried out several terrorist-style attacks against U.S. targets, the U.S. retaliated by launching cruise missiles against bin Laden.¹⁸

Information dimension.

Nation-states and non-state actors use the information environment to collect, process and disseminate information, as well as gain power and influence. The influence these actors gain exceeds the geographic boundaries and international political constraints that limit actors without information technology. Two methods through which actors in the operational environment attempt to gain power and influence are through interaction with the media and through cyberterrorism. The additional power and influence thus attained comes at a relatively low cost. Since the cost is low and the potential effects

are great, U.S. adversaries use the information environment to prosecute a conflict indirectly rather than directly confronting U.S. military might. The U.S. military conducts information operations to simultaneously decrease an adversary's will and ability to fight as well as protect friendly force information.¹⁹

All actors in the operational environment seek to influence and exploit the media to their advantage. The media offers increased situational understanding and the ability to influence international opinion. Nation-states and non-state actors can use the media to gain situational awareness that they could not otherwise obtain. It is a well known fact that even U.S. military forces watch CNN, or use Internet news sources, to obtain information on current operations of their own unit. These same information sources are equally available to terrorist organizations and provide similar understanding to a low-tech adversary at minimal cost.

The ability to disseminate information in real time can be used to affect public opinion and the conduct and legitimacy of military operations. Even individuals become important because they can get a global audience if they can get the attention of the media.²⁰ Western society, steeped in the information age, is more susceptible to media influence than most other societies due to the widespread access to information systems. Societies with limited access to information systems, such as in poor or closed societies, are less influenced by international media. Media coverage of operations and real-time dissemination of information affects world opinion, international relations and strategic interaction. The media provides U.S. opponents the most effective means of attacking the national will of the U.S. population.²¹ It follows that an urban terrorist campaign offers more opportunity for success to a terrorist organization because there is greater access to the media. Bin Laden used urban terrorism when his organization bombed the hotel in Aden, the World Trade Center in New York, the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and the USS Cole. This is especially true today because real-time images are broadcast around the world.²²

Cyberterrorism is a dangerous threat within the information dimension. Technical societies such as the U.S. are extremely dependent on the rapid exchange of accurate information. A concerted attack on

the computer networks supporting the U.S. financial systems could lead to economic disaster. A collapse in the U.S. would quickly spread to other markets around the world due to their ever increasing interdependence.

The FBI defines cyberterrorism as terrorism that initiates, or threatens to initiate, the exploitation of or attack on information systems. The government and civilian infrastructure in the U.S. is highly dependent on computer hardware and software systems as well on the networks that form the infrastructure upon which the information is transported. This dependence jeopardizes public safety because computer systems are easily attacked at low expense and with virtual anonymity to an adversary.²³ Use of the information infrastructure is increasingly shared by both military and civilian activities.²⁴ In fact, ninety percent of military messages flow through commercial channels.²⁵

Military dimension.

The military dimension of the operational environment is characterized by several factors, including U.S. military dominance, alliances and coalitions, asymmetric warfare, and increasing proliferation of arms among developing nation-states.

The U.S. will remain the dominant military power during the next 15 years due to its economic power and information and weapons technology. This does not mean that other nation-states and non-state actors cannot threaten the U.S. Terrorists and other adversaries use asymmetric warfare, applying their comparative advantage against an area of U.S. relative weaknesses to mitigate the risk of a direct confrontation with the U.S. Rather than engaging the U.S. military on its terms, opponents select political and military strategies designed to deter the United States from using force, to exhaust American will, to mitigate U.S. strengths, and to exploit perceived U.S. weaknesses.²⁶

Adversaries can gain relative strength by isolating the U.S. and creating their own alliances and coalitions. Many of these alliances and coalitions are fragile, however, because aside from the shared enmity for the U.S., coalition partners have different views of end states and means for attaining them, requiring compromise. This is particularly true in today's world of economic interdependence and political interactions. Opponents like bin Laden may also attempt to exploit potential sources of friction

between U.S. coalition partners, such as communication systems, operational differences, language barriers, and cultural and ethnic differences.

Alliances and coalitions are not the only areas where the U.S. is vulnerable. Observation over time has led opponents to perceive that the US is slow to get involved, requires time to build combat power, depends heavily on favorable public support, is over-reliant on technology and is unwilling to commit to operations that have a high likelihood of generating large numbers of casualties.²⁷

Future adversaries will use urban areas as a means to negate the U.S. superior weapons and information technology, to gain greater access to the media, and will use cities as sanctuaries to avoid U.S. firepower. Urban operations degrade weapon capabilities, are troop and supply-intensive, and make the application of firepower more complex than in unpopulated areas.

U.S. forces can not assume that the U.S. homeland and overseas staging areas will provide security or be immune to terrorist attack. Global terrorism is a characteristic of military operations that offers U.S. adversaries an asymmetric means of attacking U.S. forces before they deploy. The terrorist's interpretation of international law argues that it is legal to attack U.S. military power-projection capabilities by attacking installations, information systems, or transportation nodes.²⁸ Osama bin Laden, as well as other Islamic terrorists, feel the Muslim world is at war with the U.S. and may, therefore, legally attack U.S. targets. This perspective is discussed in further detail in the third chapter.

Developing and unstable countries are becoming increasingly dangerous with the proliferation of conventional and unconventional weapons. The U.S. is the primary exporter of conventional weapons while, at the same time, it participates in arms control efforts, peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations.²⁹ This paradox fuels bin Laden's perspective that the U.S. is a purveyor of violence, not peace. The consequences of a more armed operational environment are felt throughout the world as globalization brings nation-states and cultures closer together. Terrorists, such as bin Laden, exploit the proliferation of weapons by fueling hatred between Muslims and non-Muslims.

Globalization Dimension.

The globalization dimension includes economic, cultural, demographic and environmental issues. Globalization is a dynamic system that has replaced the Cold War system since the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1989. Markets, nation-states, non-state actors and technologies are integrating more than at any time in history. Individuals, corporations and nation-states can have cheaper, faster and greater influence around the world.³⁰

Not everyone in the world supports globalization. Anti-globalization movements include political, religious, and cultural groups, and some extremist elements threaten Western interests with violence.³¹ Some elements oppose globalization simply because it is dominated by American culture and, where it reaches, tends to overwhelm traditional culture and local interests to create a homogenized global society based on Western values.³² Western culture is particularly repulsive to Islamic fundamentalists. Although globalization arose from a desire to make a better life, some people are threatened by the changes that globalization creates.³³ When people feel their way of life is threatened they fight against the system.³⁴

Globalization is opposed by many people, including bin Laden, because it creates a sense that a degree of sovereignty is lost. Samuel Huntington explains this concept by writing, “The more citizens begin to feel that in the new system of globalization things are controlled from afar, not from at home, the more the globalizers in these countries will be exposed to attacks.”³⁵ If citizens feel that their own government is not in control of their country, then globalization undermines the legitimacy of the government. At the same time governments also realize that the solution to many problems requires cooperation with other nation-states. Huntington describes the tension leaders face when he states, “. . . elites in some torn non-Western countries will try to make their countries part of the West, but in most cases face major obstacles to accomplishing this”³⁶ A group of experts in various areas echoes this sentiment in *Global Trends*:

Globalization and technological change are raising widespread expectations that increased international cooperation will help manage many transnational problems that states can no longer manage on their own. Efforts to realize such expectations will

increase, but concerns about national interest as well as the costs and risks involved in some types of international activism will limit success.³⁷

People see the power of globalization taking control of their lives. According to Friedman “Clearly, one of the biggest challenges for political theory in this globalization era is how to give citizens a sense that they can exercise their will, not only over their own governments but over at least some of the global forces shaping their lives. . . . the globalization system doesn’t discriminate—it leaves both the weak and the powerful feeling a loss of control and under the thumb of unelected and at times uncontrollable forces.”³⁸

Another problem created by globalization is that societies are growing closer together. As societies grow closer, differences become more obvious and frequently lead to conflict. Huntington describes this phenomenon by stating “differences between civilizations are real and important; civilization-consciousness is increasing; conflict between civilizations will supplant ideological and other forms of conflict as the dominant global form of conflict.”³⁹

Not everyone agrees with Dr. Huntington. Professor Fouad Ajami, a Lebanese Shi`ite, sees fault lines of potential conflict aligned mainly along nation-state boundaries rather than between civilizations. Dr. Ajami writes,

“Civilizations and civilizational fidelities remain. There is to them an astonishing measure of permanence. But let us be clear: civilizations do not control states, states control civilizations. States avert their gaze from blood ties when they need to; they see brotherhood and faith and kin when it is in their interest to do so.”⁴⁰

Conflict between Western and Islamic civilizations has existed for 1,300 years. From the eleventh to the thirteenth centuries the Crusades attempted to bring Christianity to the Islamic Holy Land.⁴¹ Modern interventions by the West into the foundations of Muslim culture are seen as a continuation of the Crusades. Even U.S. intervention to defend the sovereignty of nation-states in the region is viewed as part of Christianity’s Crusade against Islam, as is the introduction of Western military troops into the region and their continued presence.⁴² Many Arabs feel humiliated by the presence of Western troops because it appears the Arabs are unable to shape their own destiny.⁴³ Even as Western governments

helped eject the Turks from Arab lands, T.E. Lawrence wrote “Some appeared to resent a war which allowed outsiders to thrust into their business.”⁴⁴

Urbanization contributes to increased culture and ethnic tensions by causing people of different cultures to live in greater proximity to each other more than ever before. It is estimated that forty-five percent of the world population resides in urban settings and it is projected that in the next ten years the percentage will increase to sixty. Cultural and demographic factors that transcend borders make conflict resolution more complicated because there are more parties involved in negotiating.⁴⁵

Perceived unequal economic opportunity and environmental degradation further increase the tensions that exist between differing cultures. Global epidemics on the scale of human immunodeficiency virus/autoimmune deficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS), damaging weather patterns attributed to global warming, and life threatening pollution due to overuse of the environment spark a global consensus for action on health issues and the environment.⁴⁷ The effects of ecological problems, states ecologist Paul Ehrlich, are increased as the world’s lifestyle “Americanizes” through globalization, and the global ecosystem is on the blink of collapse.⁴⁸ In the future, serious deterioration of living standards for the bulk of the population in several major Middle Eastern countries could lead to serious, violent political upheavals in Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia.⁴⁹

Threat dimension.

Multiple direct and indirect threats exist to U.S. vital interests, to the interests of her allies, and to the stability of regions of interest. Transnational groups conduct a wide range of activities that threaten US interests and citizens at home and abroad, including terrorism. Advances in technology make terrorist attacks more potent.⁵⁰ As the year 2015 approaches, terrorist tactics will become increasingly sophisticated and designed to achieve mass casualties. The trend toward greater lethality in terrorist attacks is expected to continue.⁵¹

Violence causes further ethnic disputes, religious rivalries and competition for power. Spiraling violence causes human disasters, which contribute to refugee migrations, further threatening the

environment and regional stability.⁵² Groups that employ violence to achieve their objectives are networking to create synergy in their efforts.

The trend toward transnational terrorist networks leads to the formation of an international terrorist coalition with diverse anti-Western objectives and access to weapons of mass destruction (WMD).⁵³ Most anti-US terrorism will be based on perceived ethnic, religious or cultural grievances. Terrorist groups will continue to find ways to attack U.S. military and diplomatic facilities, companies and citizens.⁵⁴

Terrorist organizations thrive in states with weak governments and economies, situations generally accompanied by ethnic, cultural, or religious tensions. Domestic groups will challenge weak governments, and transnational terrorist networks will exploit the situation in their efforts to seek safe-havens. Decreased state-supported political terrorism and increased information technology reduces the political constraints placed on ideological terrorist groups. States that actively sponsor terrorism today may decrease or even cease their support by 2015 as a result of regime changes, rapprochement with neighbors, or of having come to the conclusion that terrorism has become counterproductive. However, weak states may cooperate with terrorists as a way to gain political leverage.⁵⁵

The least constrained terrorist is one that is independently wealthy and able to finance his own terrorist attacks, such as Osama bin Laden. In the past, terrorists relied on a nation-state to provide financial support. But with the money came constraints on the group's activities. Lack of political constraints make bin Laden particularly dangerous. Friedman discusses the power of individuals like Osama bin Laden:

When you combine the angry men that Americanization-globalization creates with the way in which globalization can super-empower people, you have what I believe is the real, immediate national security threat to the United States today: the Super-Empowered Angry Man. . . . The greatest threat that the United States faces today is from Super-empowered individuals who hate America more than ever because of globalization and who can do something about it on their own, more than ever, thanks to globalization.⁵⁶

Threats such as these make the world in 2001 and into the future an unpredictable place. Terrorists that play a significant role in the operational environment argue that their actions against the U.S. and its interests are justified based on their view of the U.S. as the real international terrorist.

Chapter 3: Justifying Terrorism

*Terrorizing you, while you are carrying arms on our land, is a legitimate and morally demanded duty. It is a legitimate right well known to all humans and other creatures. Your example and our example is like a snake which entered into a house of a man and got killed by him. The coward is the one who lets you walk, while carrying arms, freely on his land and provides you with peace and security.*⁵⁷

Osama bin Laden

Strategy of Terrorism

Many terrorists see violence as their only means of gaining power to cause change. “All terrorism involves the quest for power: power to dominate and coerce; to intimidate and control, and ultimately to effect fundamental political change.”⁵⁹

Terrorism is an application of the indirect approach, a tactic stressed by the noted military theoretician J.F.C. Fuller. Fuller explains the indirect approach by writing:

Thus a move around the enemy’s front against his rear has the aim not only of avoiding resistance on its way but in its issue. In the profoundest sense, it takes the line of least resistance. The equivalent in the psychological sphere is the line of least expectation. . . . For if we merely take what obviously appears the line of least resistance, its obviousness will appeal to the opponent also; and this line may no longer be that of least resistance.⁶⁰

Regarding the terrorist’s application of the indirect approach, theorist Michael Walzer wrote, “In war, terrorism is a way of avoiding engagement with the enemy army. It represents the extreme form of the strategy of the ‘indirect approach.’ While many people refuse to include terrorism as a means of conducting war, that is a moral judgement.”⁶¹ The indirect approach is increasingly used by terrorists as they view their activities as part of an on-going war. Their approach to this conflict has caused something which several terrorism experts call a new “war paradigm.”⁶²

Terrorist organizations employ the indirect approach to avoid wasting resources in a direct confrontation with an opponent’s army, carefully selecting targets for the application of violence that will achieve the five key objectives. First, violent acts seek to focus attention on the terrorist’s organization and its purpose. Even before the advent of the Cable News Network (CNN), terrorist violence has been designed to create psychological effects beyond the immediate victim. The target audience is national and international opinion.⁶³ Live satellite transmissions only make the psychological effect more

immediate and globally shared. When asked by CNN correspondent reporter Peter Arnett about his future plans, Osama bin Laden replied, “You’ll see them and hear about them in the media. . . .”⁶⁴ Bin Laden made this comment not only because he wants to keep his actions secret, but more importantly because he uses the media to enhance the psychological effect of his activities, to cause fear. Some people feel that certain terrorists do not want media attention. Friedman writes, “*The Economist* once noted that ‘it used to be said of terrorists that they wanted a lot of people watching and not a lot of people dead.’ But not the Super-Empowered Angry Men. They want a lot of people dead. They are not trying to change the world. They know that they can’t, so they just want to destroy as much as they can.”⁶⁵ Most terrorists seek change but feel that the international community will not respond without destruction.

A second objective of terrorist violence is acknowledgement. Terrorists want the nation-state and the international community to acknowledge, sympathize with, and support their cause. It is a subjective decision whether a person or organization is labeled terrorist, depending on whether a person sympathizes with the perpetrator or the victim of an attack.⁶⁶ Terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman writes, “Use of the term [terrorist] implies a moral judgement; and if one party can successfully attach the label terrorist to its opponent, then it has indirectly persuaded others to adopt its moral viewpoint.”⁶⁷

Another objective of the terrorist organization is the recognition of their right to conduct extremist activities, recognition which then justifies acceptance of their cause by other actors in the global community. Once the extremist organization’s rights are recognized, the group begins to attain authority. Authority to effect changes in government or society is the fourth terrorist objective. The last objective is governance, the consolidation of direct control over the nation-state.⁶⁸

Terrorist attacks are more lethal than in the past. While the number of terrorist acts committed by most types of extremist groups have declined, the number of attacks by religious terrorist groups has increased.⁶⁹ The number of fatalities from religious terrorist acts is usually higher because the pool of enemies is more broadly defined. A politically motivated terrorist organization uses violent acts to achieved more narrowly focused goals.⁷⁰ Religious extremists committed only twenty-five percent of the

violent terrorist acts in 1995, but were responsible for fifty-eight percent of the fatalities associated with terrorism.⁷¹

Justifying Terrorism

Terrorists use numerous arguments to justify the use of terrorist acts as a means to achieve their desired ends. Among the arguments used are meeting religious obligations, establishing their Muslim sovereignty, legal acts in a declared war, terrorism is the only means available to them, and that terror bombing has historically been used by the western powers themselves.

Jihad is the Islamic concept of conflict. *Jihad* is the obligation of every Muslim to defend the physical and spiritual *ummah*, the community of the true believer and of salvation. To wage *jihad* is just because the legal basis for *jihad* comes from the Muslim holy book, the Quran, the principle source of Islamic law.⁷² *Jihad* is a legal instrument and method of resolving conflict that is used by the Muslim believer in their relations with the non-Muslim world.⁷³ Therefore, many Muslims view the *jihad* as a means of defending their way of life. The rationale is that anywhere an overwhelming number of Muslims practice the Islamic way of life, that area becomes the sovereign territory of Islam.

An Islamic extremist, such as Osama bin Laden, defines the sovereign territory of Islam in different ways, however most agree that the Arabian Peninsula is part of this territory. The Arabian Peninsula is important because the two Holy Places, Mecca and Medina, are located there. In bin Laden's declaration of war against the U.S., he declares that the U.S. presence on the peninsula affects the emotions of the "entire Muslim world . . . more than a billion [Muslims] in the world today."⁷⁴ The actions of Islamic extremists suggest an interpreted sovereignty over an ever larger territory because bin Laden, and others like him, join in conflicts throughout the world. Members of Al-Qaeed, bin Laden's organization, have fought in Bosnia, Kosovo, Somalia and Chechnya. While there are many divisions within Islam, the objective of expelling the non-Muslim from the Holy Land unifies the disparate elements into a coalition.

The importance of the Islamic religion to the peoples of the Arabian Peninsula and other predominantly Muslim areas of the world makes traditional nation-state boundaries more nebulous than in

other areas of the world not unified by religion. The Islamic religion commands great power because the governments of Arab nation-states derive a large measure of their legitimacy from Islam. Heads of state and high-ranking government officials use their family bloodline to Mohammad to establish legitimacy and authority to rule. One example is the Hussein family in the Kingdom of Jordan. King Fadh's claim to power in Saudi Arabia is based on the fact that he has inherited the title of the "Custodian of the Two Holy Shrines."⁷⁵

The situation does not mean that the U.S. cannot engage Arab governments, nor that Islam intends to conquer the world. However, these views do signal the U.S. must exercise sensitivity in preventing the erosion of a host government's legitimacy, especially in the globalization age. As Islam spreads through the migration of its adherents, Western interests and influence do not need to be displaced. Rather, the U.S. must acknowledge the birthplace of Islam in meaningful ways.

The global operational environment is defined in part by the many people who feel that their way of life is threatened by globalization, a phenomenon that has "Americanized" many areas of the world. Shi'ite Muslim theologians feel alienated and desire great change in the world order. Ayatollah Baqer al-Sadr wrote, "We have two choices: either to accept it with submission, which means letting Islam die, or to destroy it, so that we can construct the world as Islam requires." Others share the view that Muslims must defend their way of life from the American way of life. Sheikh Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, spiritual leader of the Hezbollah Muslim extremist group, justified Islamic terrorism in 1996 based on the principle of self-defense. Fadlallah stated, "We are not preachers of violence, *Jihad* [holy war] in Islam is a defensive movement against those who impose violence." He sees the U.S. as the common denominator behind opposition to Islam.⁷⁶ Furthermore, after the 1972 Munich Olympics massacre, UN delegates of many developing countries justified the terrorist attack as a legitimate act in a struggle for liberation from foreign oppression.⁷⁷

An extremist will not acknowledge he is a terrorist just for the sake of committing terrorist acts. The terrorist blames his actions on the necessity of overcoming oppression, and that the real terrorist is the society, government, or the economic system that the terrorist is targeting.⁷⁸ Sheikh Muhammad

Hussein Fadlallah explains his perspective on terrorism by writing, “We don’t see ourselves as terrorists because we don’t believe in terrorism. We don’t see resisting the occupier as a terrorist action. We see ourselves as *mujihadeen* [holy warriors] who fight a Holy War for the people.”⁷⁹

Terrorists, such as Osama bin Laden, justify their attacks by declaring war on the government or people they are targeting. Bin Laden’s declaration of war, called a *fatwa*, is a clerical sanction used to legitimize the terrorist acts of his organization.⁸⁰ The declaration of war that bin Laden made against the U.S. is discussed later, however the legitimacy of the *fatwa* is briefly mentioned here to show how the U.S. itself helped legitimize bin Laden’s declaration of war.

After the U.S. embassies were bombed in Tanzania and Kenya on August 7, 1998, by bin Laden’s network, former Secretary of State Madeline Albright called the U.S. conflict with terrorism the “war of the future.”⁸¹ The U.S. also went on to argue the right of self-defense under article 51 of the UN Charter to justify launching the August 20, 1998, military strikes into the Sudan and Afghanistan in an attempt to kill bin Laden and other members of Al-Qaeed.⁸² The attacks, dubbed Operation El Dorado Canyon, were called preemptive because bin Laden had announced he had other attacks still pending.⁸³ The arguments used by the U.S., normally reserved for disputes between two nation-states, elevated the status of bin Laden and his *fatwa* by using the self-defense argument in relation to a non-state actor. Further complicating the legitimacy of the U.S. military strike are claims that one target, a chemical production plant in Sudan, was actually a baby formula factory.

Terrorists also justify their attacks by arguing that the method and weapons they use are their only available means of resistance. Terrorism is the poor man’s air force. One Algerian terrorist stated, “I hardly see a difference between a girl who places a bomb in the Milk-Bar and the French aviator who bombards a *mechta* [village] or who drops napalm on a *zone interdite* (zone dividing two opposing forces).”⁸⁴ A similar view was expressed by a Middle Eastern Muslim activist saying, “We lack the arms possessed by the enemy. We have no planes or missiles, not even artillery with which to fight evil. The most effective instrument for inflicting harm with a minimum of losses is this type of operation.”⁸⁵

From the terrorist's perspective the U.S. itself employs terrorism as a tool of "Gunboat Diplomacy" and war, a somewhat valid argument. Ramzi Yousef, the mastermind of the February 26, 1993, World Trade Center bombing which killed six people and injured over a thousand, gave the following testimony at his trial reflecting terrorist justification for violent actions:

You were the first one who killed innocent people, and you are the first one who introduced this type of terrorism to the history of mankind when you dropped an atomic bomb which killed tens of thousands of women and children in Japan and when you killed over 100,000 people, most of them civilians, in Tokyo with fire-bombings. You killed them by burning them to death. And you killed civilians in Vietnam with chemicals as with the so-called Orange agent. You killed civilians and innocent people, not soldiers, in every single war you went to. You went to wars more than any other country in this century, and then you have the nerve to talk about killing innocent people. And now you have invented new ways to kill innocent people. You have so-called economic embargo, which kills nobody other than children and elderly people, and which, other than Iraq, you have been placing the economic embargo on Cuba and other countries for over thirty-five years. The government in its summations and opening statement said that I was a 'terrorist.' Yes, I am a terrorist and I am proud of it. And I support terrorism so long as it was against the United States government and Israel, because you are more than terrorists; you are the one who invented terrorism and [are] using it every day. You are butchers, liars and hypocrites.⁸⁶

The actions of the U.S. and her allies in World War II lend credibility to Yousef's claims. Extremists are not the only source of terrorism. Supposedly legitimate bombing of targets that have little to no military value is also worthy of international condemnation.⁸⁷ Terror bombing, as used by allied forces in World War II, sought the destruction of civilian morale. Terror bombing was part of the theory of airpower developed by Giulio Douhet. The homes of the elderly, women and children were destroyed in Germany and Japan.⁸⁸ Although 100,000 civilians were killed at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, many more people were killed in fire bombing attacks in Germany and Japan. The world's only use of an atomic bomb against human beings was by the U.S.

Terrorists also justify attacks on dual-use systems, those elements of the national infrastructure that are used by both the military and civilian sectors. A "growing intermingling in the integrated information society of systems used and needed by both the military and civil sides of society . . . is making our national information infrastructure a viable, legal, and ethical target in the case of conflict."⁸⁹ The same electrical system that powers a military installation (legitimate military target) also powers

civilian life support systems (target associated with terrorism). Targeting electrical grids in an attempt to disable military capabilities will also effect non-combatants.⁹⁰

In Kosovo, sixty percent of the targets engaged by NATO forces were dual-use. A fine line separated which targets were defined as military, and which were defined as civilian. Although most targets were military, power grids were bombed to demoralize the population of Belgrade and Serbia. The problem is that the same power grids that supported the Serbian government and military also supplied electricity to hospitals and to water treatment and pumping stations.⁹¹ Destroying critical dual-use infrastructure could have a catastrophic effect on a technology dependent society. From an extremist's viewpoint, terrorist organizations that destroy a power plant with a bomb planted by one of their members are not any more culpable than the U.S. bombing with a precision guided munition (PGM). Economically inferior adversaries are not wrong just because they do not have PGMs.⁹² An Islamic extremist would support this perspective by claiming that the Quran provides the legal basis for a *jihad*, just as United Nations (UN) mandates are used as the legal basis for UN actions.

Still others attempted to justify terrorism by defining it as a conflict between states and non-states, with each side vying for power. The term describing this type of conflict is called the "gray area phenomenon," a term which:

came to be used to denote threats to the stability of nation states by non-state actors and non-governmental processes and organizations; to describe violence affecting immense regions or urban areas where control has shifted from legitimate governments to new half-political, half-criminal powers; or simply to group together in one category the range of conflicts across the world that no longer conform to traditionally accepted notions of wars as fighting between the armed forces of two or more established states, but instead involved irregular forces as one or more of the combatants.⁹³

Some of the terrorist arguments for justification are convincing, while others are based on paranoia. One of the most dangerous extremists using these justifications for his actions is Osama bin Laden.

Osama bin Laden

Osama bin Laden is the seventeenth son of Saudi construction magnate Muhahhad bin Laden. After the former Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, Osama bin Laden participated in the Afghani Jihad

beginning in early 1980. He distanced himself from the U.S. despite the U.S. providing \$3 billion to the Afghan resistance via the CIA.⁹⁴ He became a leader of the Afghan Arabs and a regional hero.⁹⁵ When bin Laden and others returned to Saudi Arabia expecting a hero's honors, their efforts were treated with indifference.⁹⁶

Bin Laden began to openly criticize the House of Saad, Saudi Arabia's ruling family, for allowing foreign soldiers on the Arabian Peninsula in the Gulf War. He further criticized the regime for allowing the U.S. military to remain in Saudi Arabia. After becoming the target of a harassment campaign, he fled to Sudan in 1991 to increase his extremist activities. In 1994, he was declared an outlaw by the Saudi government and stripped of his Saudi citizenship. A price was placed on his head and his family officially disowned him.⁹⁷ In the Sudan he escaped an assassination attempt. He was expelled from Sudan five years later under U.S., Egyptian and Saudi pressure. In 1996, he took refuge in Afghanistan.⁹⁸

In an interview, bin Laden said of these experiences:

They have pressured us a lot, especially since a lot of our money is still in the hands of the Saudi ruling family due to activities of the our family and company (Saudi construction giant, the Bin Ladin Group). The Saudi pressures are also in response to American pressures. The US government, the Egyptian government and the Yemeni government also helped in doing so. They requested me explicitly from the Sudanese regime and the pressure continued. Saudi Arabia dropped all of its conditions put to the Sudanese regime in return that I be driven out of the Sudan. The US government had already taken the same stance and pulled out its diplomatic mission from Khartoum and put forth their condition to return only after I have left. Unfortunately, the Sudanese government was in some difficult circumstances and there was a tendency inside the government that was inclined to reconciliation or surrender. There were several attempts to arrest me or to assassinate me. This has been going on for more than seven years... This is a proof in itself to Muslims and to the world that the U.S. is incapable and weaker than the picture it wants to draw in people's mind... Being killed for Allah's cause is a great honor achieved by only those who are the elite of the nation.⁹⁹

Bin Laden may lose his Afghan sanctuary as well since the Taliban began considering allowing a trial for him in a third country. The U.S. indicted bin Laden for his participation in the U.S. embassy bombings in 1998. The Taliban's change in position is probably in response to the UN-sponsored international isolation, as well as to the effects of a fierce drought.¹⁰⁰ Bin Laden's extradition may occur in spite of his bankrolling the Taliban's capture of Kabul and of his becoming one of the most trusted advisors to Mohammed Omar, the leader of Afghanistan's ruling regime.¹⁰¹

Bin Laden remains very powerful and an excellent organizer. Through his network of extremist groups, bin Laden is able to influence the actions of four to five thousand terrorists.¹⁰² His influential role in the Afghan *jihad*, coupled with his money and organizational skills, has helped him develop an enormous network of multi-national, interconnected and semi-dependent extremist organizations, along with many wealthy supporters.¹⁰³

His role as a financier of terrorism is pivotal, experts say, because he has revolutionized the financing of extremist movements by forming and funding his own private terror network. Bin Laden devotes not only his own fortune to his cause, but also his business acumen. Using companies in the U.S., Europe, and the Middle East, the Foundation for Islamic Salvation funnels money to Islamic extremist groups around the world.¹⁰⁴ Al-Qaeda, “The Base,” is bin Laden’s umbrella organization for his network of terrorist organizations. Al-Qaeda was established by Osama bin Laden in 1990 to bring together the same Muslims he helped finance, recruit, transport, and train to fight in Afghanistan against the Soviet invasion. The organization’s strategic aim is to “reestablish the Muslim state” throughout the world.¹⁰⁵ Al-Qaeda also maintains moneymaking businesses, collects donations from like-minded supporters, and illicitly siphons funds from donations to Muslim charitable organizations.¹⁰⁶

Osama bin Laden’s Perspective

Thomas Friedman summarizes Osama bin Laden’s strategic objective: “The constant theme of the Saudi millionaire terrorist Osama bin Laden is that America has to get out of the Arabian Peninsula, and out of the Islamic world at large, because its way of life is ‘defiling the Islamic home.’”¹⁰⁷ In February 1998, bin Laden issued a *fatwa*, a declaration of war, against the U.S. One excerpt from the fifty-two page *fatwa* reads: “The cause of the disease and its tribulation is the occupying American enemy, so all effort must be directed at this enemy; kill it, fight it, destroy it, break it down, plot against it, ambush it . . . God the almighty willing, until it is gone.”¹⁰⁸ Bin Laden warned that all American troops must leave the “Land of the Two Holy Places,” Mecca and Medina, otherwise “military action” would be taken against them.¹⁰⁹

Bin Laden and other Islamic extremists equate the U.S. presence on the Arabian Peninsula to Turkey's occupation of the region at the beginning of the Twentieth Century. Bin Laden writes in his *fatwa*:

there is no more important duty than pushing the American enemy out of the holy land. [Referring to the] Mongol invaders, Ibn Taymiyyah stated, "to fight in defence of religion and Belief is a collective duty; there is no other duty after Belief than fighting the enemy who is corrupting the life and religion."¹¹⁰

Furthermore, bin Laden attributes U.S. involvement in defending the sovereignty of nation-states in the region as an excuse to control one of the world's richest oil supplies:

The presence of the USA Crusader military forces on land, sea and air of the states of the Islamic Gulf is the greatest danger threatening the largest oil reserve in the world.¹¹¹ We believe that the current prices are not realistic due to the Saudi regime playing the role of a US agent and the pressures exercised by the US on the Saudi regime to increase production and flooding the market that caused a sharp decrease in oil prices.¹¹²

Bin Laden goes on to describe the U.S. as a country that uses terrorism itself while condemning others who commit the same acts:

The US today as a result of the arrogant atmosphere has set a double standard, calling whoever goes against its injustice a terrorist. It wants to occupy our countries, steal our resources, impose on us agents to rule us based not on what God has revealed and wants us to agree on all these. If we refuse to do so, it will say you are terrorists... Wherever we look, we find the US as the leader of terrorism and crime in the world. The US does not consider it terrorism when hundreds of thousands of our sons and brothers in Iraq died for lack of food or medicine... We look upon those heroes, those men who undertook to kill the American occupiers in Riyadh and Khobar (Dhahran). If the American presence continues, and that is an action, then it is natural for reactions to continue against this presence. These are the troops who left their country and their families and came here with all arrogance to steal our oil and disgrace us, and attack our religion. As for what was mentioned about the ruling (Saudi) family those in charge, do bear the full responsibility of everything that may happen.¹¹³

[R]egarding the American people, they are not exonerated from responsibility, because they chose this government and voted for it despite their knowledge of its crimes in Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq and in other places and its support of its agent regimes who filled our prisons with our best children and scholars.¹¹⁴

Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeed do not fear the U.S. The U.S.'s demonstrated lack of political will in Lebanon and Somalia convinced bin Laden that he can force the U.S. to leave the Arabian Peninsula region.

Defence Secretary [Perry] of the Crusading Americans had said that "the explosion at Riyadh and Al Khobar had taught him one lesson: that is not to withdraw when attacked by coward terrorists." Where was this false courage of yours when the explosion in Beirut

took place on 1983 CE (1403 A.H)... But your most disgraceful case was in Somalia; whereafter vigorous propaganda about the power of the USA and its post cold war leadership of the new world order you moved tens of thousands of international force, including twenty eight thousands American solders into Somalia. However, when tens of your solders were killed in minor battles and one American Pilot was dragged in the streets of Mogadishu you left the area carrying disappointment, humiliation, defeat and your dead with you. Clinton appeared in front of the whole world threatening and promising revenge , but these threats were merely a preparation for withdrawal. You have been disgraced by Allah and you withdrew; the extent of your impotence and weaknesses became very clear.¹¹⁵

Bin Laden's view of the U.S. as a weak nation probably did not change after Operation El Dorado Canyon failed to destroy any significant assets in August 1998. The attack also did little to deter bin Laden, as demonstrated by the attack on the USS Cole.

Saad Regime

Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeed do not recognize the House of Saad as the legitimate rulers of Saudi Arabia. He declares that the Saudi ruling family is "insufficiently Islamic" and increasingly advocates the use of violence to force movement towards extremism. Bin Laden believes the Saad regime lost its legitimacy when King Fahd decided to allow Western troops into the Kingdom during the Gulf War. Bin Laden states in his *fatwa*:

The U.S. feels it is dealing with the legitimate government, but there are a large number of people in SA who do not feel the regime is legitimate. Through its course of actions the regime has torn off its legitimacy: (1) Suspension of the Islamic Shari'ah law and exchanging it with man made civil law. (2) The inability of the regime to protect the country, and allowing the enemy of the Ummah the American crusader forces to occupy the land for the longest of years.¹¹⁶

The foreign soldiers, especially the U.S. military, are viewed as occupiers of the land of the two Holy Places and the foundation of the house of Islam.¹¹⁷ King Fahd inherited the title "Custodian of the Two Holy Shrines," however in the eyes of many Muslims he is not protecting Islam and the Two Holy Places if foreign troops are on the Arabian Peninsula.¹¹⁸ In his *fatwa* and in an interview with CNN, bin Laden denounces the U.S. presence on the Arabian Peninsula:

It is out of date and no longer acceptable to claim that the presence of the crusaders is necessity and only a temporary measures to protect the land of the two Holy Places. Especially when the civil and the military infrastructures of Iraq were savagely destroyed showing the depth of the Zionist Crusaders hatred to the Muslims and their children, and the rejection of the idea of replacing the crusaders forces by an Islamic force composed of the sons of the country and other Muslim people.¹¹⁹ Regarding the criticisms of the ruling

regime in Saudi Arabia and the Arabian peninsula, the first one is their subordination to the US. So, our main problem is the US government while the Saudi regime is but a branch or an agent of the US.¹²⁰

When Iraqi forces threatened Saudi Arabia, bin Laden approached the princes with plans to defend the Kingdom without foreign forces.¹²¹ Bin Laden justifies terrorism as the only way to cause change in Saudi Arabia by saying, “[I] tried to approach the regime in many ways, but now the only choice left is armed action.”¹²²

Bin Laden’s dissatisfaction may have less to do with his commitment to Islam and more to do with feelings of greed. As the seventeenth son in his family, and considering the lower standing of his family among Saudi royalty, bin Laden did not receive the power and wealth that other members of the royal family enjoy. The poor economy in the Kingdom caused infighting among the royal families for more power. Since the 1970’s, the per capita income in Saudi Arabia has dropped by half. The House of Saud has four thousand male members seeking a larger share of private ventures. While bin Laden felt disenfranchised by the ruling family, the Saudi middle class was also shrinking, providing bin Laden with a willing supply of “soldiers” for his cause.¹²³

Having defined how terrorists justify their actions and described bin Laden’s perspective specifically, the discussion now turns to U.S. counterterrorism (CT) policy and strategic aims and how the U.S. views the problem.

Chapter 4: Strategic Policy and Operational Design

Campaigns are planned and conducted to support strategic objectives. Operational design, such as that found in FM 3-0, is applied to CT as an area in the spectrum of war operations for which the Army is responsible for planning and execution. The three levels of war are strategic, operational and tactical, and operational art and design are used to link strategic aims with tactical actions. The strategic level is the level at which a nation determines national and multinational security objectives. Strategy is the art and science of developing and employing armed forces and other instruments of national power in a synchronized fashion to secure national or multinational objectives. The National Command Authority (NCA) translates policy into national strategic military objectives which form the basis for all military operations.¹²⁴

At the operational level, answering four questions help planners focus on the problem the campaign is intended to solve.

1. What military (or related political and social) conditions must be produced in the operational area to achieve the strategic goal (ends)?
2. What sequence of actions is most likely to produce that condition (ways)?
3. How should resources be applied to accomplish that sequence of actions (means)?
4. What are the likely costs or risks in performing that sequence of actions (risk management)?¹²⁵

The operational level of war is the level at which campaigns and major operations are conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or areas of operations (AOs). It links the tactical employment of forces to strategic objectives. The focus at this level is on operational art, defined as:

the use of military forces to achieve strategic goals through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of theater strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles. Operational art determines when, where, and for what purpose major forces are employed by arranging their efforts in time, space, and purpose. It is translated into operation plans through operational design.¹²⁶

FM 3-0 defines tactics as,

the employment of units in combat. It includes the ordered arrangement and maneuver of units in relation to each other, the terrain, and the enemy to translate potential combat power into victorious battles and engagements. Tactical success is measured by the contribution of an action to the achievement of operationally significant results. Battles and

engagements that do not contribute to the campaign objectives, directly or indirectly, are avoided.¹²⁷

Strategy is determined before the other two levels of war. The National Security Strategy is the document that provides the basis for U.S. strategic aims.

National Security Strategy

Once the purpose for applying operational art to strategic problems is understood, it is important to understand why the U.S. Army is involved in CT and how the National Security Strategy (NSS) addresses the problem of terrorism. The NSS defines how the U.S. solves challenges in the global environment. It establishes strategic guidance for advancing U.S. interests through the instruments of national power. The national military strategy, derived from national security policy, forms the basis for all operations in war and military operations other than war.¹²⁸

The NSS has three core objectives. The first objective is to enhance our security with effective diplomacy and with military forces that are ready to fight and win. The second is to bolster America's economic prosperity, and the third, to promote democracy abroad. The NSS is based on a belief that U.S. strength and international leadership are essential to a safe and prosperous America.¹²⁹

The U.S. achieves the NSS's objectives through a policy of engagement. Engagement requires that the U.S. be prepared and willing to use all appropriate instruments of national power to influence the actions of other states and non-state actors. The U.S. must also demonstrate the will and capability to exert global leadership and to remain the preferred security partner for states that share U.S. interests.

Regarding terrorism, the NSS specifically calls for continuous action to stop terrorists before they act and to hold them accountable if they do commit a terrorist act. The NSS further identifies the need to use diplomatic and military tools to shape the international environment.¹³⁰ The NSS requires that the instruments of national power take actions to mitigate the effects of transnational threats, and directs interagency coordination as well as international cooperation to combat terrorism:

Combating these dangers which range from terrorism, international crime, and trafficking in drugs and illegal arms, to environmental damage and intrusions in our critical information infrastructures requires far-reaching cooperation among the agencies of our government as well as with other nations. The United States will continue appropriate sharing of intelligence and information with other nations to counter terrorism, corruption

and money-laundering activities, and fight drug trafficking. ...International cooperation to combat these transnational threats will be vital for building security in the next century.

Former-President Clinton established the current U.S. CT policy with Presidential Decision Directive-39 (PDD-39) on May 28, 1998. The NSS addresses the key concepts of PDD-39:

U.S. counterterrorism approaches are meant to prevent, disrupt and defeat terrorist operations before they occur, and, if terrorist acts do occur, to respond overwhelmingly, with determined efforts to bring the perpetrators to justice. . . . as long as terrorists continue to target American citizens and interests, we reserve the right to strike at their bases and attack assets valued by those who support them. . .

The NSS and PDD-39 outline the basis of U.S. CT policy, which is used to develop a military strategy, and plan and conduct military operations.

National Military Strategy

From the NSS the NCA develops the National Military Strategy (NMS). The NMS recognizes that state and non-state actors may resort to terrorism as an asymmetric means to counter the U.S. military's strengths and exploit its vulnerabilities. Terrorism has the potential to directly threaten the U.S. homeland and population and to deny U.S. access to critical overseas infrastructure.¹³¹ State and non-state actors who use terrorism to achieve their objectives threaten to obstruct economic growth and democratic development and to trigger conflict.¹³²

Operational level commanders and planners must understand the NSS and NMS regarding CT to ensure operational actions directly or indirectly support the nation's strategic aims. The concept of using operational level actions to achieve strategic aims is discussed in FM 3-0:

The military component of the national security strategy focuses on using military force as an instrument of national power. The NCA combine it with other instruments of national power to preserve, protect, and advance US interests. Military operations influence, and are influenced by, political direction and the integrated use of other instruments of power. The military objective in war is rapid, decisive victory. The NCA determine how that victory contributes to the overall policy objectives . . . commanders must understand how using military force fits into the national security strategy and the desired military conditions required to meet policy objectives All political decisions made during operations have strategic, operational, and tactical implications. Likewise, each strategic, operational, and tactical action directly or indirectly affects the political dimension.¹³³

The NSS and NMS guide the Army's selection of mission essential tasks. Of the Army's seven mission essential tasks, the one most directly related to Army involvement in CT is the task to provide support to civilian authorities.

Army forces adapt and tailor their warfighting capabilities to complement and support civil authorities and agencies at home and abroad. In times of need, Army forces provide support and expertise to reinforce or fill critical requirements beyond the immediate capabilities of civil authorities and agencies.¹³⁴

As discussed in FM 3-0, combating terrorism is a type of stability operation as well as a type of support operation.

U.S. counter terrorism policy, which the Army uses to guide its support to civil authorities, is based on four guiding principles. First, make no concessions to terrorists and strike no deals. Second, bring terrorists to justice for their crimes. Third, isolate and apply pressure on states that sponsor terrorism to force them to change their behavior. Lastly, the U.S. will bolster the CT capabilities of those countries that work with the U.S. and require assistance.¹³⁵

In the introduction of PDD-39, the U.S. begins defining its policy by stating:

It is the policy of the United States to deter, defeat and respond vigorously to all terrorist attacks on our territory and against our citizens, or facilities, whether they occur domestically, in international waters or airspace or on foreign territory. The United States regards all such terrorism as a potential threat to national security as well as a criminal act and will apply all appropriate means to combat it. In doing so, the U.S. shall pursue vigorously efforts to deter and preempt, apprehend and prosecute, or assist other governments to prosecute, individuals who perpetrate or plan to perpetrate such attacks.¹³⁶

PDD-39 uses four operational concepts to guide its CT strategy. The first concept is to reduce our vulnerabilities at home and abroad. The next concept is to deter terrorism with a clear public position that U.S. policies will not be affected by terrorist acts and that the U.S. will act vigorously to deal with terrorists and their sponsors to reduce the capabilities and support available to terrorists. The third operational concept states that the U.S. will respond to terrorism wherever it occurs, to protect Americans, arrest or defeat the perpetrators, respond with all appropriate instruments against the sponsoring organizations and governments, and provide recovery relief to victims as permitted by law. The last operational concept is that weapons of mass destruction will receive the highest priority for developing

effective capabilities to detect, prevent, defeat and manage the consequences of the use of nuclear, biological or chemical (NBC) materials or weapons by terrorists.¹³⁷

The NSS, the NMS, and PDD-39 form the strategic basis for the application of operational design concepts as outlined in FM 3-0. FM 3-0 uses the NSS, the NMS and PDD-39 to describe how the Army conducts operations to combat terrorism. FM 3-0 provides the following key definitions:

Terrorism is the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear. It is intended to coerce or intimidate governments or societies. Terrorists usually pursue political, religious, or ideological goals. Enemies who cannot compete with Army forces conventionally often turn to terrorist tactics. Terrorist attacks often create a disproportionate effect on even the most capable conventional forces. Terrorist tactics from arson to employing weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Army forces routinely conduct operations to deter or defeat these attacks. Offensively oriented operations are categorized as *counterterrorism*; defensively oriented operations are *antiterrorism*.¹³⁸

Counterterrorism (CT) is offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. Army forces participate in the full array of counterterrorism actions, including strikes and raids against terrorist organizations and facilities outside the US and its territories. Counterterrorism is a specified mission for selected special operations forces that operate under direct control of the NCA or under a combatant command arrangement.¹³⁹

Antiterrorism is defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist attacks, to include limited response and containment by local military forces.¹⁴⁰

Operational Design Applied to Defeat Osama Bin Laden and Al-Qaeed

The operational design provides a conceptual linkage of ends, ways, and means, linking national strategic aims to tactical actions in a campaign plan. The elements of operational design, as outlined earlier, are tools to aid in designing major operations. After defining the elements of operational design, the application of each is indicated to demonstrate how they apply to a CT campaign plan.

End State and Military Conditions

FM 3-0 defines endstate at each level of war:

At the **strategic** level, the end state is what the National Command Authorities want the situation to be when operations conclude both those where the military is the primary instrument of national power employed and those where it supports other instruments. It marks the point when military force is no longer the principal strategic means. At the **operational** and **tactical** levels, the *end state* is the conditions that, when achieved, accomplish the mission. At the operational level, these conditions attain the aims set for the campaign or operation.¹⁴¹

For a CT campaign against Osama bin Laden, the end state is when Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeed are incapable of financing, executing, or influencing terrorist organizations and acts of terrorism. The military condition for achieving the endstate is that Osama bin Laden is arrested or dead. Simply isolating him is not enough because he may regain support in the future. However, in order to eventually arrest bin Laden, he must first be isolated. A campaign focusing on bin Laden and Al-Qaeed is realistic. Terrorism cannot be eradicated, but certainly a particular terrorist organization's extremist actions are containable and manageable.¹⁴² Just as with any operational planning, it is necessary to identify the enemy's centers of gravity.

Centers of Gravity.

FM 3-0 provides the Army's definition for centers of gravity:

Centers of gravity are those characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. Destruction or neutralization of the enemy center of gravity is the most direct path to victory. The enemy will recognize and shield his center of gravity. Therefore, . . . examine many approaches, direct and indirect, to the enemy center of gravity.¹⁴³

The center of gravity is Osama bin Laden because his personal fortune, influence and organizational skills are critical for developing and maintaining the terrorist network, and for conducting attacks. Bin Laden's \$300 million fortune is the primary source of freedom of action and physical strength. Without his money, bin Laden and Al-Qaeed could not conduct terrorist attacks, nor finance other terrorist organization's attacks. Targeting terrorist funding is a critical component of defeating a terrorist.¹⁴⁴ Bin Laden uses the money to pay Al-Qaeed "soldiers," to purchase weapons and equipment, to construct training facilities, to establish phony businesses, and to pay for other Islamic extremist groups to do the same.

Bin Laden is not only influential because of his money. He is also influential because of his experience in the Afghan *jihad*. This influence is exploited by bin Laden, in conjunction with Islamic law, to develop the will to conduct attacks. Islamic clerics who co-signed bin Laden's *fatwa*, or who offer moral support, provide bin Laden with the legitimacy he needs under Islamic law to kill people.

Bin Laden's influence is a critical capability. His influence over the members of Al-Qaeed, who are pledged to defend bin Laden and his organization, ensures that those suspected of collaborating against the organization are killed.¹⁴⁵ His powers of influence have given him an uncanny ability to communicate his commitment to the cause and remain free and alive. Several critical requirements are necessary to support bin Laden's key capabilities, primarily communications equipment, a sanctuary and security.

Bin Laden communicates using satellite phones, facsimile machines and the Internet, all of which are vulnerable media.¹⁴⁶ Bin Laden limits his use of satellite telephone due to the ease with which the U.S. can locate the origin of the call. Members of Al-Qaeed also leverage technology. For example, Haroun Fazil, a bin Laden operative in Kenya, referred to himself as "the media information officer of the East Africa cell." Following the U.S. embassy bombings, the FBI seized and downloaded Fazil's personal computer. Information on the computer demonstrated how bin Laden uses technology to communicate.¹⁴⁷

Bin Laden requires a sanctuary to maintain freedom of action. Without a safe base of operations he is more vulnerable to arrest or attack, as is any terrorist.¹⁴⁸ Regarding his current sanctuary, a critical vulnerability is the alliance between bin Laden and the Taliban. There is evidence that this alliance is threatened. The crippling economic effects of international isolation and a fierce drought are two factors forcing the Taliban to consider extraditing bin Laden to a third country for trial. The Taliban are consulting with Islamic religious scholars before making a decision.¹⁴⁹ Bin Laden experienced a similar problem in Sudan where international pressure caused the government of Sudan to tell him to leave the country.

Within his sanctuary bin Laden requires security to remain free and alive. Members of Al-Qaeed have participated in previous assassination attempts. The U.S. government recruits people who can provide intelligence on bin Laden's whereabouts.¹⁵⁰ Bin Laden varies his movements by having several sites established each night where he can sleep. He picks a location at the last moment, only notifying one or two aides in advance.¹⁵¹

Organizational skills are another of bin Laden's exception attributes. He established companies throughout the world to support his terrorism network by accumulating and laundering money, purchasing weapons and equipment, and providing a covering operation for the network's personnel. Bin Laden established several businesses in Sudan: a holding company, a construction business, agricultural businesses, two investment companies, a leather company, and a transportation company. He used the businesses to procure explosives, weapons and chemicals.¹⁵² In Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia and Kenya he purchased land for training camps, warehouses for storage, communications and electronics equipment, transferred funds between accounts, and transported currency and weapons.¹⁵³ Bin Laden's satellite telephone company provides communications.¹⁵⁴

Bin Laden's organization of Al-Qaeed includes a strategic level, an operational level and a tactical level. The *fatwah* committee is made up of senior members of the Al-Qaeed, the members rule on Islamic law and disseminate *fatwahs*.¹⁵⁵ The *majlis al shura* (consultation council) discusses major operations.¹⁵⁶ Al-Qaeed's military committee discusses tactical matters, including training al-Qaeed members. Bin Laden also appoints a chain of command.¹⁵⁷ He wrote a letter appointing the leader of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad cell in London.¹⁵⁸ Additionally, bin Laden made policy directing the militarization of the East Africa cell of Al-Qaeada.¹⁵⁹ Members are directed to request missions through bin Laden and send situation reports to him.¹⁶⁰

Without bin Laden the terrorist network will disintegrate. Targeting the network is important to weaken the organization since all the sub-elements depend on each other for resources.¹⁶¹ Although terrorist organizations are viewed as "leaderless resistance, due to the compartmentalized nature of the organizations,"¹⁶² bin Laden plays a critical role. However, he must communicate to effectively use his organizational skills. His critical requirements include communications equipment and alliances. The communications equipment is easy to detect, trace and interdict, however bin Laden is aware of the vulnerabilities and has stopped using several types of communications equipment for security reasons.¹⁶³

Alliances are also a critical vulnerability. The U.S. can attempt to isolate bin Laden by creating mistrust within the network and Al-Qaeed, to weaken his alliances with the National Islamic Front in the

Sudan, with representatives of the government of Iran, and with Hizballah.¹⁶⁴ At bin Laden's direction, ranking Al-Qaeed members built a coalition between terrorist groups.¹⁶⁵ Furthermore, bin Laden's alliance with the Taliban is well documented.¹⁶⁶ During questioning in the embassy bombings investigation, Al-Qaeed members discussed the united front that bin Laden had formed with other Islamic terrorist organizations against the U.S.¹⁶⁷

Without his \$300 million fortune Osama bin Laden is vulnerable to assassination and arrest. Bin Laden is a hero of the Afghan war, but he is worth a \$5 million dollar reward in the U.S.¹⁶⁸ He also has a substantial price on his head in Saudi Arabia. There were many heroes in the war in Afghanistan, so if bin Laden loses his money he loses his value to the Taliban and thus he loses his sanctuary in Afghanistan. Even among his closest aides bin Laden is not safe. Jamal Ahmed Al-Fadl, was one of bin Laden's closest aides, testified at his trial for the two U.S. embassy bombings, that he once made a plan to "liquidate" bin Laden.¹⁶⁹

In the Sudan bin Laden purchased sanctuary by building a highway from the interior of the country to the country's main port. The project was expensive, one that the Sudanese government could not afford, but providing the Sudanese people a highway adds legitimacy to the government. Eventually, the Sudanese government gave in to pressure from the U.S., Saudi Arabia, and others in the international community and forced bin Laden to find a new location for his base of operations.

The U.S. started to seize Osama bin Laden's assets with former-President Clinton's Executive Order 12947. The order directs that the U.S. property and financial assets belonging to bin Laden and eleven of his associates be frozen and prohibits U.S. financial transactions with them.¹⁷⁰ It is rumored that as part of Operation Allied Force the U.S. demonstrated it is capable of using cyberwarfare to seize financial assets. The U.S. government seized financial assets belonging to Milosevic's wife and associates to cause the people around Milosevic to encourage him to meet NATO's demands.

Decisive Points and Objectives

A decisive point is a geographic place, specific key event, or enabling system that allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an enemy and greatly influence the outcome of an attack. Decisive points are keys to attacking or protecting centers of gravity. Since a force can control, destroy, or neutralize all the possible decisive points

with its available resources, only decisive points that will most quickly and efficiently overcome the enemy center of gravity become objectives.¹⁷¹

The primary decisive points in the CT campaign plan are seizing bin Laden's fortune, isolating him, destroying bin Laden and Al-Qaeed assets, and finally seizing bin Laden himself. Before seizing bin Laden's money, the Department of Defense must determine the location of his financial accounts and infiltrate the financial institution's computer system. Isolating bin Laden requires diplomatic efforts in the United Nations, in the Arab League, with the Taliban in Afghanistan, in bin Laden's own network, and within Al-Qaeed. Destroying physical assets is the most simple of the decisive points to achieve. Locating, targeting and executing attacks on physical objects, such as training facilities and equipment, are practicable with spy satellites. Seizing bin Laden is the most difficult of the decisive points, for reasons described above. These decisive points follow logical lines of operations.

Lines of Operations

FM 3-0 defines lines of operations as:

the directional orientation of the force in time and space in relation to the enemy. They connect the force with its base of operations and its objectives. In geographic terms, lines of operations connect a series of decisive points that lead to control of the objective or defeat of the enemy force. **A force operates on *interior lines* when its operations diverge from a central point.** With interior lines, friendly forces are closer to separate enemy forces than the enemy forces are to each other. Interior lines allow a weaker force to mass combat power against a portion of the enemy force by shifting resources more rapidly than the enemy. **A force operates on *exterior lines* when its operations converge on the enemy.** Operations on exterior lines offer the opportunity to encircle and annihilate a weaker or less mobile enemy; however, they require stronger or more mobile forces.¹⁷²

Geographic references are less useful in stability and support operations, FM 3-0 states logical

lines of operations:

... link multiple objectives and actions with the logic of purpose—cause and effect. In a linkage between objectives and forces, only the logical linkage of lines of operations may be evident. Multiple and complementary lines of operations work through a series of objectives. Logical lines of operations also help commanders visualize how military means can support nonmilitary instruments of national power.¹⁷³

Though the definition of logical lines of communication is poorly written, the concept is important to support the planning of stability and support operations. Logical lines of operations link multiple objectives and forces with a purpose in a cause and effect relationship. Similar to geographically

oriented lines of operations, logical lines of operations seek to overwhelm the enemy with multiple problems, objectives and forces to achieve a common purpose. The endstate is achieved by synchronizing military and non-military instruments of national power.

A campaign against Osama bin Laden follows logical lines of operations. Logical lines of operation are directed at the objectives of seizing bin Laden's money, isolating him, destroying his assets, and eventually capturing him.

Culminating Point

In the offense, the *culminating point* is that point in time and space where the attacker's effective combat power no longer exceeds the defender's or the attacker's momentum is no longer sustainable, or both. The defensive culminating point marks that instant at which the defender must withdraw to preserve the force.¹⁷⁴

In operations where stability or support predominate, culmination may result from the erosion of national will, decline of popular support, questions concerning legitimacy or restraint, or lapses in protection leading to excessive casualties. Operational culmination in a stability or support mission usually occurs when the force is spread too thinly to control the situation, from a lack of resources, or from the inability to supply resources when needed. Then small failures may cascade into larger defeats, shocks in the political arena, or inability to provide the necessary support.¹⁷⁵

Osama bin Laden will reach his culminating point when the majority of his financial assets are seized. This is his culminating point because it is where he loses his freedom of action and physical strength. Any remaining assets, funds which cannot be seized, will have to be committed to keeping bin Laden alive and free. He will not have the luxury of using his assets to finance terrorist acts.

Once the majority of bin Laden's money is seized, an information operation will notify the world that he no longer has the means to pay for a sanctuary or to support extremist activities. The information operation will further isolate bin Laden, a process that started at the beginning of the campaign.

Operational Reach, Approach, and Pauses

Good operational design balances operational reach, operational approach, and operational pauses to ensure the force achieves its objectives before it culminates. The operational design should extend operational reach while avoiding culmination and operational pauses.

Operational reach is the distance over which military power can be employed decisively. **Operational approach** is the manner in which a commander attacks the enemy center of gravity. The **direct approach** applies combat power directly against the

enemy center of gravity or the enemy's principal strength. The **indirect approach** attacks the enemy center of gravity by applying combat power against a series of decisive points that avoid enemy strengths. An **operational pause** is a deliberate halt taken to extend operational reach or prevent culmination.¹⁷⁶

The indirect approach is employed by maneuvering to avoid enemy strengths and degrade enemy capabilities, and to refuse combat in unfavorable and unnecessary situations.

The definition of operational reach in FM 3-0 only supports planning that is based on positional reference. The definition of operational reach should include a concept of operational reach as it applies to stability and support operations using logical lines of operations.

Operational reach applies to the CT campaign plan in relation to destroying bin Laden's physical assets and capturing him. For example, bin Laden is located in Oruzgan in central Afghanistan, twenty miles from Kandahar. Oruzgan is within the physical operational reach of U.S. military aircraft, however bin Laden's base of operations might lie outside the operational reach of the U.S. military. If one of the country's surrounding Afghanistan refuses to grant over-flight authority through the country's airspace to allow aircraft to reach bin Laden, then his location lies beyond the military's reach.

The FM 3-0 definition of operational reach also does not account for the cyber warfare dimension, a non-positional medium through which U.S. military personnel could seize bin Laden's fortune from a foreign bank at the direction of the NCA. The U.S. military is capable of doing this, as demonstrated by actions taken to intercept money belonging to Slobodan Milosevic's wife and cronies during Operation Allied Force. If U.S. personnel are not able to infiltrate into the right financial institution's computer system, or the act is deemed illegal, the objective is not within the operation reach of the U.S. military.

Seizing Osama bin Laden himself requires the use of both direct and indirect approaches. Indirect approaches, isolating bin Laden and seizing his fortune, make him vulnerable. Physically seizing him uses a direct approach. The direct approach becomes more effective with the success of the indirect approaches. The definition of operational pause in FM 3-0 is logistically and geographically oriented. To support planning a campaign plan that uses logical lines of operation, an operational pause may occur to

avoid culminating due to loss of legitimacy, to increase isolation of bin Laden, or to seize more of bin Laden's money to bring him closer to culmination.

An operational pause is not necessary when U.S. forces physically seize bin Laden. The capabilities of the U.S. military, including Special Operations Forces (SOF), preclude culminating on a mission to seize bin Laden unless the enemy attrits the U.S. unit to the point that the mission fails. U.S. military capabilities that can prevent premature culmination are such things as launching the force from a carrier and in-flight refuelling.

Simultaneous and Sequential Operations

Operational design is used to synchronize subordinate unit actions in time, space, and effects to link the theater strategy and design of major operations to tactical execution to prevent wasting resources without achieving decisive results.¹⁷⁷ Simultaneous operations seek to employ combat power against the entire enemy system, concurrently engaging as many decisive points as possible. Simultaneity exploits depth and agility to overwhelm enemy forces with immediate consequences throughout the AO. The presence of multiple threats overloads enemy command and control (C2) systems, causing enemy commanders to confront many decisions within a very short time. Simultaneous operations place a premium on information superiority and overwhelming combat power. Force size and force projection constraints may limit the ability of Army forces to achieve simultaneity. Effective operational designs employ complementary and reinforcing joint and service capabilities to achieve maximum simultaneity.¹⁷⁸

Sequential operations achieve the end state by phases, destroying and disrupting the enemy by concentrating combat power at successive points over time, exposing the center of gravity step by step. The scale of the operation relative to available resources and the strength of the enemy may make sequential operations necessary.¹⁷⁹

Isolating and locating Osama bin Laden, as well as the early stages of seizing his money, may occur simultaneously. While DoD personnel use computers to infiltrate the financial institutions that hold bin Laden's money, all instruments of national power work together to isolate bin Laden from

international support, from the Al-Qaeed organization, from the Islamic extremist organization's network, and from the Taliban in Afghanistan. Once bin Laden's money is seized, the DoD uses information operations to complete his isolation. Military forces destroy Al-Qaeed's key facilities and Special Operations Forces seize bin Laden in Afghanistan or as he attempts to flee to a new sanctuary. The final stages of seizing bin Laden's fortune and capturing him occur sequentially.

Nonlinear and Linear Operations.

Stability operations and support operations are normally nonlinear. In nonlinear operations, units operate in noncontiguous areas throughout the AO, or orient on objectives without geographic reference to adjacent forces when operating in contiguous AOs. Nonlinear operations typically focus on multiple decisive points to induce paralysis and shock among enemy troops and commanders. Nonlinear operations proceed along multiple lines of operations, and lines of communication (LOC) often diverge from lines of operation.

In linear operations, maneuver units operate in contiguous AOs. Combined arms forces direct and sustain combat power against enemy forces. The ratio of forces to space and the array of maneuver forces emphasize geographic position, creating a continuous forward line of own troops (FLOT). A continuous FLOT protects and simplifies LOCs, which in turn increase the endurance of Army forces and ensure freedom of action for extended periods.

A campaign plan targeting Osama bin Laden uses non-linear operations. Units involved in seizing bin Laden are noncontiguous. There are no adjacent forces and no operational level sustainment, only tactical. Multiple decisive points are used simultaneously and sequentially to cause bin Laden and his network to feel paralysis and shock.

Tempo

Tempo is the rate of military action. Controlling or altering that rate, relative to the enemy and with consideration for timing of the effects achieved, is necessary to retain the initiative. Friendly forces maintain the initiative when their tempo exceeds the enemy's ability to react. Rapid tempo is

complemented with simultaneous operations, by avoiding needless combat and allowing independent action and initiative. The cost of rapid tempo to the force is greater fatigue and resource expenditure.¹⁸⁰

Simultaneously seizing bin Laden's money, completing his isolation and destroying his key facilities will cause bin Laden to lose the initiative. Bin Laden will lose the initiative because he must focus efforts on regaining backers and on finding funding to buy support, to acquire a sanctuary, and to replace the key equipment and facilities that will enable him to avoid being captured.

One of the strengths of the campaign plan outlined is that it avoids needless combat. The majority of actions against bin Laden use an indirect approach. Once he is weakened and vulnerable, the direct approach is used to seize him. Even the destruction of key facilities and equipment targets assets that may help bin Laden avoid being seized, such as aircraft, vehicles, or heavily defended compounds and positions.

Chapter 5: Conclusion and Recommendations

The elements of operational design in the U.S. Army's FM 3-0, *Operations*, are useful in framing a counterterrorism campaign for dealing with Osama bin Laden and his organization. However, several definitions require further refinement to enhance their utility when planning campaigns which involve influential non-state actors. Addressing the problems posed by non-state actors in the operational environment is important to national security. The operational environment in 2001, as well as in the foreseeable future, will be influenced by non-state actors almost as much as by nation-states. Any person or group that is capable of killing seventeen U.S. sailors and nearly sinking a multi-billion dollar U.S. warship must be considered a serious threat. As stated in the introduction, some people consider CT "the war of the future."

The operational environment in 2001 is influenced by several terrorist organizations. The U.S. Army must be capable of dealing with these organizations in stability and support operations. To make the elements of operational design more useful, some of the definitions must include the type of non-traditional military forces that are found in stability and support operations such as terrorist organizations.

The definition of lines of operations requires greater clarity in its description of logical lines of operations. Logical lines of operations have greater application in stability and support operations where the friendly forces must use information operations to maintain legitimacy and dissuade fighting between opposing factions. The mere presence of U.S. soldiers contributes to achieving objectives in stability and support operations, but in these scenarios the orientation to geographic lines of operations is not necessarily important. Logical lines of operations provide a way to an opponent's culminating point, which is another element of operational design that needs its definition modified to better support planning.

The definition of culminating point is focused too much on the enemy as a nation-state, and not enough on non-state actors. It centers around comparing the effective combat power of the opponents. The U.S. military will always have greater combat power than Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeed, a fact which obviously has no effect on his culminating point. Using the traditional combat power comparison,

bin Laden would be at his culmination point from the beginning. In the Port of Aden, in October 2000, the U.S. Navy had more combat power than bin Laden, but bin Laden succeeded in severely damaging the USS Cole. Furthermore, the discussion of application of the concept of culminating point to stability and support operations focuses primarily on nation-state issues, such as the erosion of national will and the decline of popular support. It is true that bin Laden is concerned with legitimacy and support, but his support base is minute and like-minded, and if he loses the support of one person he finds another individual. Bin Laden does need the support of host nation governments to provide him sanctuary, support he has so far acquired through his financial power. He will not lose a sanctuary until he loses his money, and as long as he has money he can move from one country to another. The definitions of elements of operational design that are related to preventing culmination also need to be altered.

The definition of operational reach and operational pause are oriented on logistics and geographic points. These definitions need refinement to also support logical lines of operations in stability and support operations. When using logical lines of operations, the concept of operational reach may include the legitimacy or legality of an action under international law. Along similar lines an operational pause may become necessary to settle questions of legitimacy or gain national or international support for an operation. Changing the definitions would make these elements of operational design more useful in stability and support operations.

The U.S. Army is going to become more involved in counterterrorism. Terrorist attacks will continue. Civil authorities require U.S. Army support in their efforts to plan and execute counterterrorism campaigns. Support to civil authorities is an Army mission essential task. The Army may be called on in stability or support operations to contribute to a counterterrorism campaign. Proactive steps now, before further terrorist attacks, would better position the U.S. Army for “the war of the future.”

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- ¹⁵⁶ Ibid, 7-8.
- ¹⁵⁷ Ibid, 23.
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